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ABSTRACT
This paper is a theoretical attempt to formulate an
ontological understanding of design as a set of
articulations and modes of acting that manipulate
the materiality of the world in order to re-direct
and re-orient the possible ways of inhabiting,
accessing and shaping the world. Such an
understanding puts forward a way of approaching
the question of politics in, of and for design that
design and politics should be understood as a
twofold embedded in one environment. This then
has consequences both for design and for politics.
I argue that these consequences can be understood
better through unfolding the political forms made
possible by design as well as the material and
designed forms that have become necessary given
today’s political situation. By drawing on a series
of examples, I will argue how design is already a
political form and how politics is a form of
material articulation. Such an understanding then
gives shape to the recognition of the activities and
forces that already exist in the world and sketches
out possibilities of acting upon that recognition.
INTRODUCTION
Today the topic of design and politics is not unfamiliar
to either designers or to those in politics. But despite

designers’ engagement in community-based activities,
design discourse has not yet been able to produce a
useful lexicon of concepts that could offer possibilities
of acting politically through design. However, there are
various complexities and difficulties involved in such
possible discourses. This paper tries to approach such
difficulties and complexities from the particular point of
interrogation of a possible ontological understanding of
design and design actions and of activities.
In this paper, I define an understanding of politics based
on the works of Jacques Rancière. By this I intend to
discuss when and where the political or politics are
enacted and performed and why it is important to
distinguish the political or politics from mainstream
politics or “police-politics,” as I call it. Then, I give an
understanding of design both as a noun but also as a
verb and the ways in which it deals with social and
material forces in a shared environment. I argue
that design as a mode of acting in the world acts
specifically on the mediations through which material
and immaterial human needs are met. More specifically,
I argue that design is the act of intervening in situations
in order to orient a situation in a certain way:
ideologically, on behalf of, interests and/or in terms of
that situation’s possibility. This designing runs the
gamut from the configuring of artefacts and artefactual
relations to environments, situation and policies. In fact,
the key argument is that design cannot but be involved
in these questions and that understanding “design as
politics” (Fry, 2010) and politics as design (not merely
“and”) requires that design begins to take seriously its
involvement in these questions. I introduce the nexus of
“design-politics” in which what becomes importance is
the “-“ of such nexus. This shifts the focus from design
and politics as two separate realms of knowledge to
what the twofold of design-politics produce in terms of
“affects” and “affections”. To put it simply, I try to
show how design is already political and how politics is
a matter of assembling material entities.
The question being interrogated in this text can be
summarized as follows: what if design and politics, their
meaning, devices, discourses and doing share the same
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environment and reinforce each other constantly? And if
this is the case, then how are we as design researchers
going to understand such complexity and entanglement?

THE POLITICAL AND POLITICS
It might be true that the very first impression that comes
to mind when one hears the term politics is the regimes
of “social engineering” and ideological administrations
behind political parties, commenting on contemporary
issues, and debating and supporting one particular
proposal within parliaments and governments. Within
such a sphere, cultural practices such as art, design or
literary works are often assigned to politics as a mere
ideological vehicle mobilising the crowd in favour of or
against one ideology. Thus, the anticipated contribution
of design to such an understanding of politics becomes,
for instance, the designing of electoral campaigns and
ballot boxes, propaganda posters and symbolic
representations of parties’ values.
On the contrary, there are actions, protests, revolts and
refusals to such thinking and doing of politics. As much
as power shifting among parties goes on, there are
certain revolts that do not identify themselves with these
figurations. Short or long, brief or extensive, historical
practices of refusal are evidence to the desire of those
who do not see any identical relation between what has
been assigned to them by politics, of what they are as
demos, nations, women, workers, students, migrants,
and what they possibly can be. It has been suggested
that another name be given to these forms and practices
in order to avoid confusion with first and mainstream
meaning of politics, that is, party politics. “The
political” is the term used by a wide range of scholars to
differentiate the forms of doing and thinking politics
from party politics. Starting with Carl Schmitt
(1996[1927]), continuing with Hannah Arendt
(1998[1958]), and reintroduced by Chantal Mouffe
(1993), they suggest we should call those conflictual
moments and procedures of demonstrating another
possible politics “the political.”
However, the political becomes problematic in the case
of Schmitt, who in order to run the political, needs to
declare a state of emergency or exception announced by
sovereign power to transform demos to political
subjects. This is why he became a strong supporter of
the Nazi regime in Germany. In the case of Mouffe, the
problem is that the political requires an already reserved
place to happen through on-going and always already
conflictual consensus among adversaries.
Jacques Rancière (2001) proposes that instead of
creating a new category for practices of revolt and
refusals that are not new and that have been going on,
we should call all of them politics. All those
bureaucracies, power shifting, electoral campaigns,
debating and arguing within the mainstream politics
instead is called police by Rancière.
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A THEORY OF THE GAP: JACQUES RANCIÈRE’S TAKE
ON POLITICS

Politics for Jacques Rancière starts from the question of
“inequality”. Simply put, the political task lies in the
inscription of what is excluded or not counted. In this
sense, politics is about expressing the possibility of it by
those parts that have no part in forming a society. Such
an egalitarian axiomatic take on politics is about taking
part in being-together through politics. For Rancière,
political subjects are “fluctuating performers” who
“bring the nonrelationship into relationship and give
place to nonplace” (Rancière, 1999, p.89).
For him, the problem of mainstream politics or policepolitics mainly reveals itself to us by the notion of
inequality as he focuses on it. Mainstream politics acts
as if certain persons know both the public good and the
good of others, while those others are not strong enough
to achieve this good by themselves. Then it means they
need a certain intervention of those properly situated to
run the affairs and policing orders of society. This
mainstream politics, which is police for Rancière, is
predicated on ignorance to recognize that people can run
their own affairs, and it so assumes that they must have
experts or politicians run for them.
Politics for Rancière refers to the breaking down,
disordering and undoing of the order and stability of
police-politics, of mainstream politics. When Rancière
talks about visible and invisible, sayable and unsayable,
audible and inaudible, and so on, he considers politics
as a matter of intervention in distributing, partitioning,
assigning and attributing parts, roles, names, identities,
and so on. Therefore, Rancière argues for an
antagonistic activity of the “re-distribution of the
sensible”, of what can be said and what can be done,
what can be thought and what can be heard, which is
otherwise unsayable, undoable, unthinkable, inaudible:
“I propose now to reserve the term politics for an
extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing:
whatever breaks with the tangible configuration
whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined
by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in
that configuration—that of the part that has no part […]
an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself
demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order, the
equality of any speaking being with any other speaking
being.” (Rancière, 1999, p.29-30)
This undoing of the police-politics practically and
concretely happens through two main formulations that
assign and define who is what: time and space.
Traditionally, it has been sufficient to assert that those
that we do not wish to recognize as political beings
belong to a “domestic” space, to a space separated from
public life: one from which only groans or cries
expressing suffering, hunger, or anger could emerge, but
not actual speeches demonstrating a shared aisthesis.
And the politics of these categories has always consisted
in re-qualifying these places, in getting them to be seen
as the spaces of a community, of getting themselves to

be seen or heard as speaking subjects (Rancière, 2001).
Workers, who are supposed to be in the factory,
therefore appear not only in the streets but also in sites
of entertainment, where they can pass time. It is in this
regard that Rancière also speaks of time as another site
of possibility of politics. Politics happens when those
who have no time to do something else than their work
– in a factory (in the case of workers) or in a house or a
kitchen (in the case of women) - could overturn this
presupposed classified order of time. An interruption in
predefined partitions of time and space for a group that
has no part in partitioning its own time and space to
submit their discourse, to show they have something
more than just mouthing their pleasure or pain, to own
up the time and space which were not defined to be for
them in a policing order could open a space for political
experience. When Rancière talks about an interruption,
mismatch or displacement in the sensible order, he
essentially points to moments when a name, an identity
or a role appears at the wrong time, in the wrong place.
This mismatch in regimes of identification or
representation results in a form of disidentification or
dissensus that expresses new possibilities of taking part
in politics. Therefore, politics is not only declaring a
break from what is assigned to that non-counted part but
also staging and manifesting this non-counted part as a
collective unity which consequently would be a gap or
dissent within the whole, which has had ignored this
actual non-counted part. This is what Rancière (1992)
means when he argues that the place of politics is that
gap:
“The place of a political subject is an interval or a gap
(écart): being together to the extent that we are in
between-between names, identities, cultures, and so on.”
(p.62)
To think about Rancière’s works as “a theory of the
gap” reminds us to think of the division he makes
between police and politics, not as two separate worlds
but rather as an internal tension within what makes
politics possible. The gap here does not refer to that act
of bordering between enemy and friend, inside and
outside or between us and them, but rather to the tension
in the body of being-together as the very first feature of
politics. In fact, the contradiction between politics and
police-politics is internal to politics; it is politics and, as
Jodi Dean (2009) writes about Rancière, “it makes most
sense to think of the part that is not a part as precisely
such a gap: a gap in the existing order of appearance
between that order and other possible arrangements, the
space between and within worlds” (p.30).
Thus, there is police-politics that is concerned with
maintaining the order, the status quo, the state of
situation in which it includes and suppresses
possibilities under certain names, identities and defined
places and spaces assigned to various parts. Politics, on
the other hand, is the act of distancing oneself from such
distributions and formations by re-qualifying the space
and time of politics. This happens through a certain

undoing while it opens and creates its own spacetime as
well. Parts appear in “wrong” places and “wrong” time;
and by doing so, they reveal the hegemonic practices
that try to keep such parts meaningful only through one
name, one identity. Counter-hegemonic practices like
these by distancing from the state of situation re-qualify
the situation through certain acts of re-articulation of
relations among parts. They can be understood as
politics in the nexus of design-politics which will be
explained later in this paper.

DESIGN: MATERIAL ARTICULATIONS AND
MODES OF ACTING
It is common to refer to design as an act of packaging
certain instructions, desires, identities, and so forth. In
its modern use, the term design is often associated with
market, innovation and consumption. Such associations
and assumptions happen in a material world where the
designed thing, as an outcome of the skills and mastery
of its designer(s) through manipulation and operation
within the artifice, is programmed to do what a triangle
of customer, client and designer plan directly or
indirectly. Such planning might be connected to a
variety of purposes, such as to sell, to experience, to
seduce, to convey, to persuade, to impose, and so on.
Being overwhelmed with commercial and capitalist
driven forces, “alternative design approaches”, which
are often generated within design academia, argue for
the involvement of design with “other” areas than those
design traditionally and discursively has been associated
with. A range of social, political, environmental and
economic approaches are argued for in response to
design’s involvement with “wicked problems”.
Discussions on the necessity of a shift from design as a
mere “service provider” to design as a more engaged
activity in situations and systems is often present in
such approaches (for instance, see Stolterman and
Nelson, 2012). Such calls often forget that design
cannot be seen and analysed only according to its
intentions but that it must also be analysed according to
what it does and does not to other actors and in other
environments beside the actor, environment and
function it was originally designed for. Because of its
particular capabilities, design has never been and can
never be a mere service provider. Criticisms like these
are problematic because they fluctuate the problem
inherent in the discourse of design by producing new
practices and disciplines.
Design in its ontological condition that is connected
with material articulations is always shared with other
material entities within an environment. The appearance
of any design activity is already changing the
environment that designed thing is set to function in it.
The concern – that is often overlooked by designers – is
that no designed thing is isolated in the world by only
being registered and functioning in a particular
environment. Design is not and cannot be only a
“service provider” despite its intentions. Design is
always something more than services. Considering
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design as a “service provider” and building critiques on
such an assumption is the perspective of those who are
only affected by design as a service and not, for
instance, as a policing force or hostility device. Once a
chair is designed, it might be considered as an artefact
providing a particular service to its users and
consumers. But it is always more than that. The
designed chair has already performed some sort of
designation because it has manipulated the environment
by the resources it has used, the skills that were used,
the labour that was invested, and so on. And because of
this, the designed chair cannot exist only in interaction
with the aimed environment or end-users. Moreover, a
chair and the shape of it “is not the shape of the
skeleton, the shape of body weight, nor even the shape
of pain-perceived, but the shape of perceived-painwished-gone. The chair is therefore the materialized
structure of a perception. It is sentient awareness
materialized into a freestanding design” (Scarry 1985,
p.290).
This ontological condition of design points out that the
politics embedded in the chair is not enacted merely in
the office, living room or kitchen by its use and
function. Rather, the chair is spatially and temporally
embedded and oriented in the politics of before, during
and after design. This means that it is almost impossible
to think of the space and time of design in a limited
sense of the place and the time of use. The capabilities
of wood, skills, labour, workshop as a site of production
to be assembled in various ways and the possibilities of
the designed chair to be oriented towards one direction
and not the other, giving certain shapes to space in
which some bodies can occupy and some can not
(Ahmed, 2006) tell us about the complexities and
difficulties that design and its internal relation to politics
are involved in. Thus, design is not merely an outcome
of environments but also a source of production of
environments. Sometimes one is stronger than the other,
but this mutual relation is always at place. Adrian Forty
puts this clearly in Objects of Desire (1995) when he
argues that design influences how we think, and he adds
that “it can cast ideas about who we are and how we
should behave into permanent and tangible forms” (p.6).
One of the reasons that such assumptions in design
discourse appear constantly is the lack of reflection on
two separate, and at the same time overlapping, uses of
the term design: the designed thing and the design
actions and activities. The latter can be understood both
as the act and activity of designing and also as the
actions and activities flowing from the designed thing.
They are used and discussed interchangeably without
much discussion on their differences, on what they do,
what capacities they have and how they move form one
environment to another. Consequently, politics and
design are left with only two types of relationship:
either design in the service of party-politics or the
design carries explicitly political content.
Another example of such assumption and confusion
appear in Carl DiSalvo’s version of political design
4

called “Adversarial Design” (2012). Adversarial design
is the name given by him to a series of practices within
computational design that perform certain acts: they
reveal hegemony through critical information design;
they configure the remainder through social robots and
articulate collectives through ubiquitous computing.
Drawing on Chantal Mouffe’s works on agonistic
pluralism and the political, adversarial design is a way
of understanding and examining practices that, by using
design, create a space of agonism among human and
non-human adversaries (Di Salvo 2012, p.18-20). The
central idea behind adversarial design is that there is a
difference between political design and design for
politics. While the former is what Di Salvo traces in his
book as the condition for democracy by setting up
agonistic relations among adversaries, the latter is the
traditional design in service, this time in the hands of
political parties and the administration of affairs.
DiSalvo, therefore, argues that there are conditions for
political design and particularly adversarial design.
This, unfortunately, gives adversarial design an
important new role of political agency, as if the
designed world of objects, services, relations,
experiences and things is not political already. Di Salvo
dismisses the fact that design does not become political
merely by changing the content of the designed thing or
situation into explicitly political issues. Treating design
as a container of politicized ideology dismisses the
whole potential and capacity of design as a material
force in the environment that is co-inhabited by various
actors.
MATERIAL ARTICULATIONS

Design in itself, in Herbert Simon’s words (1969), is
always about “courses of action aimed at changing
existing situations into preferred ones,” and I add that
this is the case no matter what ideology, content or
orientation it takes. This means that designers should
see the world as something that can be changed. To
phrase it differently, designers should understand that
the way things are now is not how they have always
been. This ontological condition of design – that things
are always subject to change in one direction or another
due to their artificiality – therefore asserts what I call
“material articulations”.
Material articulations are forming practices that
distinguish design from other doings and makings.
Articulations in fact are a set of negotiations that
designers intentionally practice in the ways in which
they manipulate the material and the environment in
order to achieve their aims. However, such negotiations
cannot always be intentional, and the environment that
the matter is formed from/in/through can kick back and
push some drives in relation to others. Designers
redesign over and over again, re-articulate the form that
they have given to matters over a period of time, but
they often forget that the form that they impose on
material and environment is only one produced form out
of their imposition. Designers often dismiss that
forming a chair does not only form the chair as a

designed, articulated object, but also it forms the
environment because wood, steel, labour, etcetera, were
produced, taken and transformed. They also dismiss that
the chair forms the environment that the chair is
oriented towards, as well as spaces and time that it
consumes and is consumed by. Material articulations,
therefore, are a set of negotiations, partly intentionally
and anticipatory and partly invisible from designers’
perspectives, which make various forms of being
possible. They offer certain orientations and
inhabitations while restricting others.
The “material” in material articulations insists on the
artifice of things. The artifice of things affirms that
things for the simple reason that they are made can be
unmade and remade accordingly. But in fact, and above
all, it states that change is the only possible condition
for artifice. The materiality of articulation affirms the
possibility of change, reformation, redesigning,
reassembling, remaking and undoing in one way or
another.
“Articulations” refer to the importance of decision,
orientation, direction and negotiation in design actions.
Samer Akkach (2003) points this out by drawing on the
Arabic word chosen for design:
“[T]asmım (design)…[in] current usage, however,
seems to be based on tasmım as ‘determining,’ ‘making
up one’s mind’ and ‘resolve’ to follow up a matter. Thus
in linguistic terms ‘design’ is an act of determination, of
sorting out possibilities, and of projecting a choice. It
has little to do with problem-solving, the prevailing
paradigm, as the designer (musammım) seems to
encounter choices, not problems, and to engage in
judging merits, not solving problems. It is closer to
‘decision-maker’”.
The modern use of the term “tasmım” in the Arabic
speaking world reveals the directionality that design
actions always have to take. This is quite the opposite to
western-oriented education on design, where design
often is a set of skills, techniques and qualities to solve a
problem, a seemingly innocent term that refers to
making things better in general. To think of designed
things and design actions as material articulations tell us
that design should be considered as a decision and
direction embodied in all things humans bring into
being. Design is conditioned by its orientations,
directions and capacities, while at the same time
conditioning human beings, things and the world.
Design articulates possible conditions through
materialities.
MODES OF ACTING

To unfold the mentioned complexities and confusion
involved in the term and act of designing, one can
describes the word design as the multiple shifting
between the status of something that has happened (an
X has been designed and manufactured: separation
between the intellectual and technical labour) and the
active sense of it as patterning and shaping the world in

complex ways. It is in the latter part of the meaning that
Ben Highmore (2009) defines design “as a series of
negotiations, as an orchestration (of sense, of perception
and so on), as an orientation (something that encourages
and generates propensities and proclivities), as an
assemblage (and as an assembling activity, where it is
always possible that combinations themselves combine),
as an arrangement (a temporary coming together) and so
on” (p.4).
This understanding of design then is entangled with an
active environment where design takes shape and
participates in ecological, social, political and economic
contexts. Therefore, design in this sense can play the
role of distributing the senses and values, partitioning
the divisions in society from desires to labour and
consuming behaviours. When, for instance, Rancière
talks about design as an activity of configuration of
divisions of communal space, he (Rancière, 2007)
means the same:
“[B]y drawing lines, arranging words or distributing
surfaces, one also designs divisions of communal space.
It is the way in which, by assembling words or forms,
people define not merely various forms of art, but
certain configurations of what can be seen and what
can be thought, certain forms of inhabiting the material
world.” (p.91)
Therefore, design beyond an icon, symbol, identity,
profession or finished product is a certain form of acting
in the world that distributes, configures and arranges
social actions, sensual perceptions and forms of being
together or being apart. The necessity to know and
understand design as an internally political action and
attempts to orient its capacities towards certain
directions is what the task of design, which is concerned
with possible political forms, could be.
In this way, design action is not a mere instruction
embedded into the products, their interaction with users
or environments and the way they orchestrate the
experience of use or even disrupting the targeted
situation. Rather, design (both as noun and two
meanings of the verb) should be understood as a
dynamic set of negotiations that are historically and
politically concerned with “what [the] action creates
beyond what it instrumentally directed” (Fry, 2009). To
put it differently, design actions are those decisions and
directions that take action and participate in acting
rather than to act on designed instructions. Design due
to its condition, as I discussed, is always a mode of
acting, of doing and of configuring the situation in order
to propose other possible situations. As Clive Dilnot
(2005) writes:
“Essentially design is nothing else but the encounter
with given realities (actualities, situations,
circumstances, conditions or experiences) in terms of
their transformative possibilities and potentialities.
Design opens these possibilities through initiating a
process of negotiation with the given which extends the
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boundaries of the previously possible. In so doing it
transforms notions of actuality.” (Chapter 4, para. 2)
These lines affirm the internal relation between design
as a mode of acting and possible forms of politics: a
relation that is about re-qualifying the situation through
certain acts of reconfigurations and re-articulations of
relations among parts, their localities and materialities.

DESIGN-POLITICS NEXUS
So far, one might realise the difficulties and
complexities that are involved in the question of design
and politics. For approaching such difficulties, one
needs to invent concepts in order to be able to work
with difficulties. As far as my research is concerned and
as far as I have discussed the ways I understand and
argue for thinking politics and design, I propose the
concept of ‘design-politics’. The nexus of designpolitics affirms that design and politics, however
separated in the ways they perform and enact situations,
both operate through internal relations in which they
overlap in the questions of material articulations and
local sites while seeking other possible ways of
configurations. They both somehow try to affirm that
things could be otherwise than the ways they are or the
ways they have always been. What interests me in the
concept of the nexus is the importance of the relation of
forces and negotiations between two in which one
cannot be reduced to another. I argue that the focus of
the nexus of design-politics should be on the affects that
such nexus produces. The nexus of design-politics is
capable of producing multiple conditions of affect – to
affect, to act upon - and affection – to be affected by. I
understand affect here pretty close to recent theories on
affect (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; Thrift, 2008;
Stewart, 2007) as:
“Affect arises in the midst of in-between-ness: in the
capacities to act and be acted upon. Affect is an
impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes
more sustained state of relation as well as the passage
(and the duration of passage) of forces or intensities.
That is, affect is found in those intensities that pass body
to body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise),
in those resonances that circulate about, between, and
sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the very
passages or variations between these intensities and
resonances themselves.” (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010,
p. 2)
In order to understand and interrogate such nexus, I
suggest that one needs to pick up a socio-technical
artefact, a “thing” where, for instance, the thickness of
politics are skilfully reduced and thinned by design
practices. Such socio-technical artefacts are also capable
of not only telling us that design and politics are
inseparable but also how they reinforce each other
constantly, producing various and multiple affections
over the lives of individuals and communities.
Moreover, the artificiality that they introduce to abstract
discussions of political ideologies affirms the material
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fabrication of political practices, revealing their power
relations as well as affirming the potentiality of
performing and/or enacting them in other directions and
orientations.
To start with an understanding of what such nexus is
capable of producing, I would like to draw on a fictive
example: Kafka’s design of the torture machine in his
short story “In the Penal Colony” (2007[1919]).
This device, which is probably the most famous torture
machine in the history of literature, is an apparatus for
torturing those who disobey the rules. It calls our
attention to the possible materialisation of the
performance of torture. The story starts when a visitor in
a penal colony is invited to observe an execution
operated by the device. The victim is a soldier who
failed to follow an order from his officer. The officer is
responsible for the machine, and he is also the one who
explains and presents to the visitor how the machine
works in a very precise manner and almost in the same
way in which inventors or designers present their works
to their clients and customers. The device consists of
three main parts: the bed, the inscriber and the harrow,
all of which are placed below, above and in the middle,
respectively. The harrow is composed of a series of
needles that engrave the sentence on the back of the
convict’s body. However, the convict does not know
about the sentence; rather, he or she has to learn it
within his or her flesh. When the visitor refuses to speak
in favour of the machine for the condemned, the officer,
the presenter or executioner, frees the soldier and takes
his place in the machine with the sentence “Be Just!” to
be inscribed on his body. However, he dies in horrific
pain due to a malfunctioning of the machine. The design
of this apparatus and the way it is narrated in the story is
extremely elaborated and almost fetishized by the
officer, as he believes the machine brings the mystical
experience of justice to the body of the condemned. For
instance, he explains why glass material has been
chosen for making the harrow:
“[T]o make it possible for everyone to observe the
sentence as it is being carried out, the Harrow is made
of glass. This caused some technical difficulties in fixing
the needles into it, but after a number of attempts it
worked. There were no lengths we didn’t go to. And now
everybody can watch through the glass how the
inscription is carried out on the body.” (p.81)
In another part, the officer explains the reason behind
the two sets of needles used in the harrow:
“… [T]wo kinds of needle in various arrangements.
Each long needle has a short one next to it. The long
one is for writing, and the short one sprays water to
wash away the blood and keep the inscription clear at
all times.” (Ibid)
Here, I understand Kafka’s harrow beyond the spectacle
of torture. Kafka’s harrow uncovers the detailed
practices of law and their effects on human bodies
through a highly designated artefact. How law and rule

can be materialized in such a precise and pragmatic way
reveals the non-transcendentally of law. Thus, the
artifice of design and its power of articulation allow law
to represent itself as absent from such devices and
separates itself from the artificial world. As Katja
Diefenbach (2008) writes, “The law unhinges its force
of law, and transfers it to administrative measures that
do not have the status of law”.
In a sense, we can look at this harrow as what Foucault
calls “dispositif” and what Agamben calls “apparatus”
(Agamben, 2009), that is, an organisation of practices,
devices and meaning that is materially constructed and
materially affecting. Kafka’s harrow and the detailed
and developed design of it, which occupies the major
part of the story in the form of presentation, takes us
into an interrogative sphere where one can understand
and unfold the transformation of rules to norms and the
penetration of them into bodies in a very material sense
and in sensible matters. The main part of the story is the
gradual disclosure of how the machine functions, what
kind of materials are used and how it supposed to bring
justice, while there is no part describing the crime, law
or norm of the penal colony to be followed and
respected. From there we have the inscripted bodies,
shaped and formed as a result of the design’s imposition
to them. Design here is a possible violent agent for the
material act of inscription but also an informing one that
provides us with the possibility of unfolding the
practices of law. There are these details and
materialities that are enacted as witness to law and
general socio-political structures. As a consequence of
design’s overlap with politics, now we are left with new
bodies that are constantly affected and defined by such
materialisation, or as Léopold Lambert (2013) put it in a
reverse formulation, this transforms “each architecture
into penal colony machines” because they “somehow
inscribe something of the norm in the bodies’
flesh”(p.46).
While this story might be fictional, the practices of
design-politics nexus produce real effects in real life.
The notion of practices within the design-politics nexus
can be understood as a set of materially-constructed and
materially-affecting procedures organised to produce
certain effects; however, they might produce other
unintentional effects as well. The production of other
unintentional effects can be understood, for example in
what Theodor Schatzki calls “spacetime” (2010).
Spacetime are regularized phenomena that tend towards
being inertia, dismissing the ontological condition of
practices that they have become because of their
coherency and banality in everyday life. What they
really are is a set of actions done within the artificial
and material world chunked into a semiconscious
everyday activity.
In 2011, the Migration Board of Sweden
(Migartionsverket) commissioned the producers of
Bamse – a popular Swedish children’s comic book - to
make a special issue on migration. Bamse, already a
very well-known international cartoon character famous

for advocating such values as equality, was
commissioned as a migration board officer to
communicate a very strong message to children: “Those
who deserve to stay, will stay and those who do not,
will be sent back ‘home,’ but we will miss them as our
friends”. In one scene, Bamse replies to a stressed and
desperate asylum-seeking child, who, despite being the
strongest bear in the world (his famous slogan or
capacity also as the subheading of the series), cannot
solve all problems. Such rationalizing of the children’s
world when it comes to permission for residency is
obvious in illustrations’ techniques too. Throughout the
whole book, nothing is real except the migration board’s
logo and some direct pedagogic asylum policies. The
characters, which are animals, the cars and the airplane
for the planned deportation are all cartoons. The
relatives of the deported family welcome the deportees
by the airplane, which is not even possible in the real
world. The use of Bamse and the penetration into the
imaginative world of children with laws and rules that
are materially affective show the banality that the
administration of such hostilities implies. The Bamse
special comic strip on deportation tries to say that
nothing is wrong with deportation. At one point, one of
the characters advises the stressed asylum-seeking child
that it should go out and play with its friend if it is
stressed. The stress of deportation is just a part of the
process as it is staged via the illustration. The technical
rationality made through communication techniques and
illustrations are nothing new. However, the Swedish
Migration Board has been unique in using this technique
to convey and persuade children of migrants that
deportation is nothing but a normal part of their lives.
This rationalisation by apparently non-violent means is
the other side of the militarisation of borders that adopts
military technologies, armed forces and private security
companies to stop asylum seekers and refuges from
migrating.
This is not a mere co-option of design by violent forces
as it takes away the manipulative power that design has
and blames only those who co-opt the concepts for their
own sake. Design has to face its internal relation to
politics and its strong manipulative capacity due to its
power over material articulations. Because of such
power that design ontologically has, design is political
already before engaging in any explicitly political issue.
Design is engaged in making, dividing, and patterning
the ways in which lives are organised according to
certain directions or power positions. The task of design
researchers who recognize design as a political agent is
to show this internal capacity and at the same time
intervening in it in certain directions or power positions.
One example where the reorientation of material
articulations as a form of intervention within the designpolitics nexus happens is the Savorengo Ker project.
The House of All (or in Romani language, Savorengo
Ker) was an experimental self-built project initiated by
Stalker/On (a group of designers and artists), the Urban
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Studies Department of Rome University and the local
Roma community in Rome, Italy. The project was a
process of co-building a communal house in Casilino
900, the oldest Roma camp in Rome, during spring
2008. After it was finished in summer 2008, it burnt
down on the night of 12 December 2008 according to
the Casilino 900 blog, which states that the project faced
hostility from both the local Italian population and
authorities (Casilino 900, 2008). The process of
building a house in the camp was perceived by the
surrounding Italian population as a threat to the stability
of the area. This was due to the fact that some groups of
inhabitants expected the authorities to expel Roma
inhabitants and demolish the camp. Later, the local
council declared the house irregular and closed it. Even
though there was a regular planning permission for a
temporary construction, the authorities argued that the
house had been built on illegally occupied land. The
house and the act of making it reveals the contradiction
of managerial power practiced by the public
administration who, on the one hand, promised to solve
the Roma people’s situation but, on the other hand,
developed repressive measures for the population of the
camp, such as preventing car access to the camp,
stopping the provision of water and electricity and
initiating a census of the inhabitants. (Fioretti, 2011)
In February 2010, the authorities demolished the whole
camp, and its 650 inhabitants had to move somewhere
else. The communal house was designed, planned and
built together with Roma inhabitants, and was a
declaration of their house-building skills despite the
general understanding of Roma as nomads not wanting
to have housing or wanting to settle anywhere. In order
to have a house, to have a home, one has to have
history. Without home, one is left without history. That
is why the nomad functions for nation-states and their
citizens only as a geographical subject and not as a
historical one. The nomads are considered as those who
only move without any history, a population who
“invented nothing” and, therefore, has nothing to
contribute to the “public good,” according to States’
narratives. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1986)
remind us that “[I]t is true that the nomads have no
history; they only have a geography. And the defeat of
the nomads was such, so complete, that history is one
with the triumph of States” (p.73).
The House of All resembles a series of ideas that have
been practiced in design for a long time under various
titles or categories, such as Participatory Design (PD),
Co-Design and, recently, Social Innovation. The
concept of participation in design practices can be
traced back to a series of design and research practices
within the Scandinavian countries, focusing on
“workplace democracy” since the 1970s (Bødker,
1996). In particular, “participation” has been adopted
within many design practices in relation to claims or
aspirations towards the social or social change.
Participation, for example, is linked to a kind of “design
humanism” aimed at reducing domination (Bonsiepe,
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2006). Typically understood as developing methods for
including the end-users of the designed products,
systems and services, PD often discusses the process of
inclusion of those voices that are not heard in the design
process through engaging them into a series of
workshops and tools such as mock ups, prototyping and
sketching. Today, with more need to reformulate PD
due to social, economic and environmental complexity
and dynamics, some theorize participation as the
objective of design itself (Björgvinsson, Ehn and
Hilgren, 2010; Sanders and Van Petter, 2003; Margolin
and Margolin2002).
Participatory Design, Co-Design, Meta-Design and,
recently, Social Innovation put forward claims for
democratic forms of engagement among stakeholders of
a concern, which eventually would initiate a process of
bottom-up change. This is becoming more and more
popular in governmental institutional agendas because
“existing structures and policies have found it
impossible to crack some of the most pressing issues of
our times – such as climate change, the worldwide
epidemic of chronic disease, and widening inequality”
(Murray, Caulier-Grice and Mulgan, 2010).
However, the participation that is enacted within such
approaches often is a form of engagement that is in line
with a neoliberal understating of participation. People
participate to express their interests and values and
practice their rights in the social sphere (in the best
case), while remaining recognizable by their very
attributed identities that facilitate the status quo.
Participation often becomes a form of affirmation of
identities that is created to legitimize the practices of
power. This can be thought of as the lack of conflictual
and dissensual understating of participation, which in
fact is inherent in the political nature of participation
(Keshavarz and Mazé, 2013). Participation is not about
making an agreement among “all” to move further;
rather, it is actually about how the taking a part, sharing
a part or acting a part in an already partitioned dynamic
and environment can give us the ability to frame the
problem, to not get involved with things that actually try
to involve people in order to suppress or exclude them.
What is needed is what I have already argued for
through the theory of the gap in order to be able to think
of other possible forms of engagement with situations:
engagements that, while disarticulating and refusing
relations and affairs subscribed to individuals and things
by power positions, re-articulate new spaces and time
for experiencing the very same situation otherwise.
Savorengo Ker, in contrast to many PD projects, enacts
its internal relation to design-politics due to the very
idea of practicing refusal through material articulations:
refusal both in terms of refusing an identity that has
been attributed to the Roma population and also
refusing the identity of a camp for nomads. These
refusal practices were performed and enacted in the
form of a construction act of a communal “house” in a
site that is not supposed to function as a home but rather
should remain as a camp. The project developed a series

of communal methods to experience a shared space, the
camp, in new ways of co-crafting materialities and
performing them where they are not supposed to be. As
politics is about wrong names in the wrong place and
wrong time, the enactment and performance of housing
is a form of political declaration to transform the camp
into something else. The house unfolds the condition of
Roma camps while it forms a new communal or shared
space of experiencing the same site or locality.
Participants, through materializing their manifest in a
form of a materially made “home” in contradiction to a
materially made “camp”, essentially create a clear
distance from authorities and those who see the Roma
population as a threat to society and thereby
demonstrate a form of dissensus and disagreement.
Therefore, the construction of the house is a form of
mismatch or displaced communal crafting which does
not necessarily argue for a “need to shelter” but expands
the idea of shelter into the political realm of mobility
and immobility. To perform and enact such distance is
to operate within the “-“ of design-politics. To operate
within the “-“ is to make an intervention. This
intervention in return brings into being possible forms
of politics through design as a mode of acting in the
world.

FINAL REMARKS

Because design is already political no matter what it
does or how it acts, it produces conditions of politics, of
manipulation of lives of individuals and communities,
of species and ecologies. Since the nexus affirms the
internal tension and relation of design-politics, rather
than defining each side, design researchers need to
focus on the “-“, on the relation between the two, on
their tensions and intersections, which is where
practices, performances and enactments reside. It is also
where “intervention” becomes possible:

“What we “do do” affects what we “can do.” This is
not to argue that “doing” simply restricts capacities. In
contrast, what we “do do” opens up and expands some
capacities, although an “expansion” in certain
directions might in turn restrict what we can do in
others.” (p.252)

“To think intervention in the artificial is […] to focus
not on praxis (on will or acting through will – [which
means subjective projection, the exercise of the drive—
that is that it reaches its limit in action and remains
enclosed in its own circle] but on production or poiesis
[which operates in the space of possible becoming and
does not exhaust itself in the act of willing but creates
‘something other than itself’; it finds its limit outside
itself. ]—on that which negotiates with what is possible
to bring into being.” (Dilnot 2014, p.143)
One can think of intervention as an attempt to
simultaneously disarticulate materialities while requalifying, reconfiguring and re-articulating them
within sites and localities of conditions. If design and
politics are about the articulation of materials on various
levels and in certain directions, the intervention in the
design-politics nexus is about disarticulating such
twofold products, while re-articulating it in other
directions than those taken so far or those in which we
are heading towards.

There is no formula for understanding design-politics,
nor are there conditions for making it. There are only
eventually moments, situations, devices and things that
can lead us to dis-articulate and re-articulate possible
ways of inhabiting the world. In order to dis-articulate
and re-articulate the in-between-ness, the “-“ of designpolitics, one needs to formulate an entry point. While
there are multiple entry points to this in-between-ness of
design-politics, there is a politics embedded in what
entry point to choose for dis-articulation and rearticulation as it influences the process of articulation:
what is to be articulated, how is to be articulated and
into what directions. For instance, the selecting of an
entry point can be read based on lived experiences of a
researcher and research participants.
This asserts that while such possibilities might offer
new forms of politics, they also drive from certain forms
of politics. Therefore, as much as there are possibilities
of politics through design as material articulation and
modes of acting in the world, there is politics of
possibilities as well. Politics of possibilities can be
defined here in line with Sara Ahmed (2010), who
argues:

Possibilities, therefore, are not simply a set of doing and
acting that is actualised, nor are possibilities a set of not
doing. They are rather certain spatial and temporal
orientations that favour some capacities prior to others
according to localities. Thus, the question what
capacities to go for, to be potential about, is what should
be at stake for design researchers working their ways
into and through design-politics.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am grateful to those with whom I had the chance to
discuss the ideas presented in this paper: Clive Dilnot,
Maria Hellström Reimer, Susan Kozel, Johan Redström
and Cameron Tonkinwise.

REFERENCES
Agamben, G. 2009. What is an apparatus? and other
essays. Standford: Stanford University Press.
Ahmed, S. 2006. Queer phenomenology: orientations,
objects, others. Durham: Duke University Press.
Ahmed, S. 2010. “Orientations matter”, in Coole, D.
and Frost, S. (eds.), New materialisms: ontology,
agency and politics. Durham: Duke University
Press
Akkach, S. 2003. “Design and the Question of
Eurocentricity”, Design Philosophy Papers, vol. 1,

No 6 (2015): Nordes 2015: Design Ecologies, ISSN 1604-9705. Stockholm, www.nordes.org

9

no. 6, pp. 321-326.
Arendt, H. 1998 [1958]. The human condition. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Björgvinsson, E., Ehn, P. and Hillgren, P. 2010.
“Participatory design and democratizing
innovation”, Proceedings of the 11th biennial
participatory design conference ACM, pp. 41.
Bødker, S. 1996. “Creating conditions for participation:
conflicts and resources in systems development”,
Human-Computer Interaction, vol. 11, no. 3, pp.
215-236.

Kafka, F. 2007. Metamorphosis and other stories.
London: Penguin UK.
Keshavarz, M. and Mazé, R. 2013. “Design and
dissensus: Framing and staging participation in
design research”, Design Philosophy Papers, vol.
11, no. 1, pp. 7-29.
Lambert, L. 2013. The funambulist pamphlets: vol. 07:
cruel designs. New York: Punctum books.
Margolin, V. and Margolin, S. 2002. “A ‘social model’
of design: Issues of practice and research”, Design
Issues, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 24-30.

Bonsiepe, G. 2006. “Design and democracy”, Design
Issues, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 27-34.

Mouffe, C. 1993. The return of the political. London:
Verso.

Casilino900. 2008. è bruciata savorengo ker. Available:
http://casilino900.blogspot.se/2008/12/bruciatasavorengo-ker.html [2014, 8/11/2014].

Murray, R., Caulier-Grice, J. and Mulgan, G. 2010, The
open book of social innovation. National
endowment for science, technology and the art.

Dean, J. 2009. “Politics without politics”, Parallax, vol.
15, no. 3, pp. 20-36.

Nelson, H.G. and Stolterman, E. 2010. The design way:
Intentional change in an unpredictable world. 2nd
ed. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F.1986. Nomadology: the war
machine. New York: Semiotext (e)
Diefenbach, K. 2008. To bring about the real state of
exception: The power of exception in Agamben, the
power of potentiality in Negri. [Online] EIPCP.
Available from:
http://translate.eipcp.net/strands/02/diefenbachstrands01en#redir [2014, 8/11/2014].

Rancière, J. 2007. The future of the image. London:
Verso.
Rancière, J. 2001. “Ten theses on politics”, Theory &
Event, vol. 5, no. 3.
Rancière, J. 1999. Disagreement: politics and
philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.

Dilnot, C. 2014. “History, design, futures: contending
with what we have made” in Dilnot, C., Fry, T. and
Stewart, S. (eds.) Design and the question of
history. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 131-272

Rancière, J. 1992. “Politics, identification, and
subjectivization”, October, vol.61, summer 1992.
pp. 58-64.

Dilnot, C. 2005. Ethics? design? Vol 1., No.2,
Archeworks, Chicago.

Sanders, L. and Van Patter, G. 2003. “Science in the
making: understanding generative research now”,
NextD Journal: ReReThinking Design, vol. 5.

DiSalvo, C. 2012. Adversarial design. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Fioretti, C. 2011. “Do-it-yourself housing for
immigrants in Rome” in Eckardt, F. and J. Eade, J.,
(eds.) The ethnically diverse city, Berlin: BWV
Verlag, pp. 535-554.
Forty, A. 1995. Objects of desire: design and society
since 1750. London: Thames and Hudson.

Scarry, E. 1985. The body in pain: The making and
unmaking of the world, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Schatzki, T.R. 2010. The timespace of human activity:
On performance, society, and history as
indeterminate teleological events. Plymouth:
Lexington Books.

Fry, T. 2010. Design as politics. Oxford: Berg.

Schmitt, C. 1996 [1927]. The concept of the political.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fry, T. 2009. Design futuring: sustainability, ethics and
new Practice. Oxford: Berg.

Simon, H.A. 1969. The sciences of the artificial.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT press.

Gregg, M. and Seigworth, G.J. 2010, The affect theory
reader. Durham: Duke University Press.

Stewart, K. 2007. Ordinary affects, Durham: Duke
University Press.

Highmore, B. 2009, The design culture reader. London:
Routledge.

Thrift, N. 2008. Non-representational theory: Space,
politics, affect, London: Routledge.

10

